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TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION IN THE W ORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION
Steve Charnovitz*
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is frequently criticized for
insufficient transparency and for a lack of participatory opportunities
for private individuals and civic society.1 For example, consider the
views of Lori Wallach, one of the most prominent opponents of the
WTO. 2 In a recently-published “comprehensive guide to the WTO” coauthored by Wallach and her colleague Patrick Woodall, a series of
criticisms were leveled, including the following:
WTO business is conducted by committees and panels that
meet behind closed doors in Geneva, Switzerland.
....
In sharp contrast to domestic courts and even other
international agreements, at the WTO there is a startling
lack of transparency, public disclosure or accountability.
....
. . . [T]he WTO is intentionally designed to insulate
against democratic pressure for change. 3

Because Wallach is an outsider to the WTO, it would be fair to
balance her views against what the insiders are saying. One insider
and frequent WTO defender is James Bacchus, a former U.S.
Congressman and an original member of the WTO Appellate Body
who served on that tribunal longer than anyone else.4 After
departing from the Appellate Body in early 2004, Bacchus wrote an
op-ed for the Washington Post in which he said:
We must open the doors of the WTO. We need to let in the
light of public scrutiny—let the 6 billion people in the world
who are served by the WTO see the organization as it really
is.

* Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.
Forthcoming Rutgers Law Review, 2005.
1. PHILIPPE LEGRAIN, OPEN WORLD: THE TRUTH ABOUT GLOBALISATION 200-01
(2002).
2. Moisés Naim, Lori’s War, FOREIGN POL’Y, Spring 2000, at 29 (an interview with
Lori
Wallach),
available
at
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/Issue119PDfs/2855wallach.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
3. LORI WALLACH & PATRICK WOODALL, WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION ? A
C OMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE WTO 15-16 (2004).
4. See generally JAMES BACCHUS, TRADE AND FREEDOM (2004).
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....
. . . Those who oppose the WTO can portray it in the
distorted way they do only because, by keeping the doors
closed, the organization’s members make it possible, and
seemingly credible, for them to do so. 5

In my opinion, Wallach and Bacchus stand as far apart as two
people can be on the overall merits for humanity of the WTO and
international trade. Yet both share the view that the WTO is
deficient with respect to its openness.
I agree with such criticism and join others in this symposium to
urge that the WTO promote greater public understanding and citizen
participation. My specific contribution will be to point out the
common thread between the norms espoused by the WTO for
national transparency and the analogous norms now lacking within
the WTO as an organization. Promoting transparency and
participation in each of the two levels of governance—national and
international—will be mutually reinforcing and serve to enhance
governmental accountability.
This article proceeds in the following manner. Part I explores the
development in international trade law of the norm for transparency
and participation at the national level. Part II describes the WTO’s
practices regarding openness and public participation, and then
criticizes the current limitations. In doing so, I discuss why the
WTO’s norms for national government should be applied to the
international trading system and why administrative law principles
are relevant to the WTO. Part III proposes several new steps for the
WTO to take to promote transparency and participation. Part IV
concludes.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSPARENCY NORM IN
I NTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
Although I am unaware of any historical study of the emergence
of international norms on transparency and citizen participation,
some key moments are apparent. One foundational development
was Immanuel Kant’s attention to “capacity for publicity” in his
essay Perpetual Peace (1795).6 In Kant’s view, the “transcendental
formula of public right” (or public law) is that “[a]ll actions that affect

5. James Bacchus, Open Up the WTO, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2004, at A25
(emphasis original).
6. Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Sketch, in PERPETUAL
PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON POLITICS, HISTORY, AND M ORALS 107, 135 (Ted
Humphrey trans., 1983); see Ruth Buchanan, Perpetual Peace or Perpetual Process:
Global Civil Society and Cosmopolitan Legacy at the World Trade Organization, 16
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 673, 692 (2003) (noting that Kant’s emphasis on publicity prefigures
the current transparency debate).
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the rights of other men are wrong if their maxim is not consistent
with publicity.”7 An important intergovernmental action was the
inclusion of Article 18 in the Treaty of Versailles providing that
“[e]very treaty or international” agreement shall be registered by the
Secretariat of the League of Nations and “shall as soon as possible
be published by it[,]” and, furthermore, that “[n]o such treaty or
international engagement shall be binding until so registered.”8
These developments may have provided intellectual context for the
emergence of transparency as an issue of international trade law.
The foundation stone of international norms for transparency
was the 1923 International Convention Relating to the
Simplification of Customs Formalities (“Customs Convention”).9 The
Customs Convention established rules for transparency and review
at the national level.10 All customs regulations were required to be
promptly published “in such a manner as to enable persons
concerned to become acquainted with them and to avoid the
prejudice which might result from the application of customs
formalities of which they are ignorant.”11 Moreover, no customs
regulations were to be enforced before being published unless
“previous publication would be likely to injure the essential interests
of the [regulating] country.”12 With regard to import and export
licenses, the Customs Convention dictated that the conditions to be
fulfilled “should be brought immediately in the clearest and most
definite form to the notice of the public.”13 Following implementation
of a regulation, the Convention directed states to use “the most
appropriate measures by their national legislation and
administration, both to prevent the arbitrary or unjust application of
their laws[,] . . . and to ensure redress by administrative, judicial or
arbitral procedure for those who may have been prejudiced by such
abuses.” 14 If a dispute arose between the parties on these
commitments, either party could refer the matter to the Permanent
Court of International Justice.15 No referrals to the Permanent Court
7. Kant, supra note 6, at 135.
8. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, June
28, 1919, The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, Vol.1, art. 18 [hereinafter Treaty of
Versailles]. Writing in 1919, the educator David Jayne Hill noted the significance of
this provision. DAVID JAYNE HILL, PRESENT PROBLEMS IN FOREIGN POLICY 34-35 (1919).
9. International Convention Relating to the Simplification of Customs
Formalities, Nov. 3, 1923, 19 A M. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 146 (1925) [hereinafter Customs
Convention]. The United States was not a party to this Convention.
10. See id.
11. Id. art. 4. Customs regulations were defined broadly to include “tariffs and
[all] import and export prohibitions or restrictions.” Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. art. 3(a).
14. Id. art. 7.
15. Id. art. 22, para. 3. This applied to the rule about enforcement before
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occurred.16
This international customs law is remarkable in its modernity.
The Customs Convention supervises the domestic policy process, and
the designated beneficiaries are not only the parties to the
Convention but also “persons concerned,”17 a class that could include
domestic persons as well as aliens. Furthermore, the Convention’s
rules are backed up by dispute settlement. It is also interesting to
note that the Protocol to the Convention contains what is now called
a “savings clause”18 to defer to past or future international treaties
relating to the preservation of the health of human beings, animals,
or plants and to the protection of public morals or international
security.19
The Convention itself lacks any provision about transparency
and
nongovernmental
participation
in
the
Convention’s
implementation. 20 No historical account of the Convention’s
implementation is readily available, and I do not know the extent of
transparency attained. In general, the economic activities of the
League of Nations did feature considerable transparency and some
private participation.21
The Convention’s history is clear in one interesting respect,
namely, an unusually inclusive negotiating process.22 The depth of
the Convention’s commitment to transparency can be traced to the
extensive participation by the International Chamber of Commerce
publication, but not to the rule about prompt publication. Id. art. 22, para. 3. For that
rule, the parties had to agree on referring the dispute to an arbitral or judicial
procedure. Id. art. 22, para. 1. In ratifying the Customs Convention, Roumania
declared its understanding that Article 22 applies to questions of a general nature,
with “private persons being only entitled to appeal to their own judicial authorities.”
Id., at 165.
16. See the following website for a list of cases of the Permanent Court of
International
Justice
for
the
years
1922-1940,
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/pcij-listofcases.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
17. Customs Convention, supra note 9, art. 4. para. 1.
18. See Laurence R. Helfer, Constitutional Analogies in the International Legal
System, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193, 218 (2003) (discussing a savings clause).
19. Customs Convention, supra note 9, at 166.
20. See Customs Convention, supra note 9.
21. See generally H.R.G. GREAVES, THE LEAGUE C OMMITTEES AND WORLD ORDER
(1931).
22. The process was inclusive in the sense of listening to the views of the
organized business community. GEORGE L. RIDGEWAY, MERCHANTS OF PEACE 204, 207–
08, 211–14, 216, 232 (1938).Labor unions, women’s groups, and environmentalists were
not present at the negotiating conference, but to my knowledge, they did not ask to be.
International Conference on Customs and Other Similar Formalities, League of
Nations, C.D.I.96(1) (1923). The feature that was unusual about the 1923 conference
was that the International Chamber of Commerce participated extensively. RIDGEWAY,
supra, at 225. As George Ridgeway explained, the conference negotiations utilized the
common feature of national government in which interested groups are given an
opportunity to assist in shaping law. See RIDGEWAY, supra, at 212-13.

5

in the Convention’s drafting process. 23 As historian George L.
Ridgeway pointed out, “[t]he influence of the International Chamber
was particularly noteworthy in the formation of policy on the subjects
of publicity, treatment of commercial travelers and samples, and
redress.” 24
The Customs Convention episode provides a good illustration of
the symbiosis between transparency and participation at the
national and international levels because nongovernmental
participation in an international conference was an important factor
in getting governments to establish better norms for transparency at
the national level. The fact that this norm developed so early in the
international trade regime, rather than in other regimes, may be
because transnational private interactions are the very essence of
international trade.25
By contrast, other international regimes were able to operate for
a long time without much attention to the domestic regulatory
process. 26 For example, the international labor regime developed
contemporaneously with the trade regime and yet the organic act of
1919 creating the International Labour Organization (ILO) omits
considerations of transparency or due process at the national level.27
Not until 1960 did the ILO get around to giving concerted attention
to the need for norms at the national level to improve governmental
decisionmaking.28 In that year, the ILO approved Recommendation
113 concerning consultation and co-operation between public
authorities and employers’ and workers’ organisations at the
industrial and national levels. 29 Among its purposes, the
Recommendation aims to ensure that governments seek the views of
these organizations in “the preparation and implementation of laws
and regulations affecting their interests.”30 Note that the ILO’s
initial lack of transparency norms for governments stood in sharp
contrast to its pathbreaking norms for the participation of nonstate
actors—in particular, employer and worker organizations—in all ILO
23. See id. at 209-16.
24. Id. at 213. The International Chamber of Commerce was consulted by a working
party of the GATT Contracting Parties in the early 1950s. See International
Convention to Facilitate the Importation of Commercial Samples and Advertising
Material, GATT, BISD 1S/94, paras. 3, 27, 29, 30.
25. See ARIKA IRIYE, GLOBAL C OMMUNITY 12-13 (2002) (noting the connection
between capitalism and the development of nongovernmental organizations).
26. See SIR ARTHUR SALTER, WORLD TRADE AND ITS FUTURE 2-3 (1936) (explaining
that “normally it is not nations but individuals that trade with each other”).
27. See Treaty of Versailles, supra note 8, Part XIII (organizing the ILO).
28. See R113 Consultation (Industrial and National Levels) Recommendation,
International
Labour
Organization
(June
20,
1960),
available
at
http://www.ilo.org./ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?R113 (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
29. Id.
30. Id. para. 5(b)(i).
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activities.31
When the United Nations convened negotiations on
international trade in 1946, the governments used the Customs
Convention as a reference point for writing new rules on the customs
process. 32 One might have expected the governments to build on and
strengthen the disciplines in that Convention. Yet as John H.
Jackson has pointed out, what happened instead is that some of the
provisions of the 1923 Convention were watered down to the point
where the Charter of the International Trade Organization (“ITO”)33
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”)
“represented a backward step.”34
In regard to transparency, the major difference between the
Customs Simplification Convention and GATT Article X (Publication
and Administration of Trade Regulations), in my view, is that Article
X’s disciplines35 apply only to measures “of general application,” 36
31. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 8, Part XIII; see generally ERNST B. HAAS,
BEYOND THE NATION STATE: FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION ch. 6
(1964) (discussing the organizational ideology of the ILO from 1919-1948).
32. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 441 (1969).
33. Id.; see also RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING -D OLLAR DIPLOMACY 369-78 (1956)
(discussing the end of the ITO and why it did not enter into force).
34. JACKSON, supra note 32, at 441; see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11 [hereinafter GATT]. The GATT, as amended, is available at
the WTO website, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm (last visited
Nov. 3, 2004).
35. GATT Article X:1 states in part:
Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general
application, made effective by any contracting party, pertaining to the
classification or the valuation of products for customs purposes, or to rates
of duty, taxes or other charges, or to requirements, restrictions or
prohibitions on imports or exports or on the transfer of payments therefor,
or affecting their sale,
distribution, transportation, insurance, warehousing inspection, exhibition,
processing, mixing or other use, shall be published promptly in such a
manner as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with
them.
GATT Article X:2 states in part:
No measure of general application taken by any contracting party effecting
an advance in a rate of duty or other charge on imports under an established
and uniform practice, or imposing a new or more burdensome requirement,
restriction or prohibition on imports, or on the transfer of payments
therefor, shall be enforced before such measure has been officially
published.
GATT, supra note 34, arts. X, paras. 1, 2.
36. GATT, supra note 34, art. X, para. 2. The WTO Secretariat has published a
useful note on the negotiating history of Article X in the 1946-48 period. See Article X
of the GATT 1994 – Scope and Application, Note by the Secretariat, G/C/W/374, at 1-4
(May
14,
2002),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_overview2002_e.htm (last visited
Nov. 3, 2004).
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while the corresponding provisions in the Convention do not contain
that limitation.37 In regard to the review of administrative action, the
disciplines in the Convention and the GATT are similar except on
one important point in which the GATT goes further.38 The GATT
requires that the review of administrative action regarding customs
matters be done by tribunals or procedures that are “independent” of
the agency that took the contested administrative action.39 In
contrast, the Convention’s provision for “redress” lacked an
independence requirement. 40
From 1948 to 1995, only one case occurred in which a
government’s trade measure was challenged pursuant to GATT
Article X and found to be a violation.41 That was the 1989 decision in
European Economic Community – Restrictions on Imports of Apples, a
complaint by the United States. 42 One charge in that dispute was
that the European Economic Community (“EEC”) had imposed a
quota on apples effective February 14, 1988 yet did not publish the
regulation until April 20, 1988. 43 While noting that such publication
met Article X:1’s requirement that measures “be published
promptly,” the panel, nevertheless, held that the EEC’s quota
violated Article X:1 because (as the panel saw it) the provision
prohibits “back-dated quotas.”44 The panel’s reasoning is a bit hard
to understand, however, because its decision reveals no arguments
by the complaining government for the Article X violation.45 Litigation
has occurred a bit more frequently in the WTO and the tendency of
adjudicators has largely been deferential to national law. 46 For
37. Compare GATT, supra note 34, art. X, paras. 1, 2 (requiring publication of
“[l]aws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general
application”), with Customs Convention, supra note 9, art. 4 (requiring publication of
“all regulations relating to customs and similar formalities”).
38. Compare GATT, supra note 34, art. X, para. 3(b) with Customs Convention,
supra note 9, art. 7.
39. GATT, supra note 34, art. X, para. 3(b).
40. Customs Convention, supra note 9, art. 7.
41. WTO, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 295-98 (1995).
42. European Economic Community – Restrictions on Imports of Apples –
Complaint By the United States, Report of the Panel, BISD 36S/135 (adopted June 22,
1989), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gt47ds_e.htm (last visited Nov. 3,
2004).
43. Id. para. 5.22.
44. Id. paras. 5.21, 5.23 .
45. See id. para. 5.1 (indicating no specific arguments by the U.S. government for
the violation of Article X).
46. A narrow/strict interpretation has also occurred with regard to GATT Article
X:3(a) which requires governments to administer “laws, regulations, decisions, and
rulings” in a “uniform, impartial, and reasonable manner all its laws, regulation.”
GATT, supra note 34, art. X, para. 3(a); see European Communities – Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS27/AB/R,
paras.
200-01
(adopted
Sept.
9,
1997),
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example, in European Communities – Measures Affecting the
Importation of Certain Poultry Products, the Appellate Body held
that GATT Article X:1 applies only to rules of general application,
not to specific rulings for individual shipments. 47
The only GATT Article X transparency violation found by a WTO
tribunal occurred in United States – Restrictions on Imports of Cotton
and Man-made Fibre Underwear, where the panel saw a violation of
Article X:2 because the U.S. safeguard period was retroactive to
imports occurring before the date of publication of the restraint. 48 The
plaintiff government Costa Rica appealed some matters in Cotton
Underwear, which gave the Appellate Body an opportunity in 1997 to
expound GATT Article X. In its decision, the Appellate Body stated:
Article X:2, General Agreement, may be seen to embody a
principle of fundamental importance - that of promoting full
disclosure of governmental acts affecting Members and private
persons and enterprises, whether of domestic or foreign nationality.
The relevant policy principle is widely known as the principle of
transparency and has obviously [sic] due process dimensions. The
essential implication is that Members and other persons affected, or
likely to be affected, by governmental measures imposing restraints,
requirements and other burdens, should have a reasonable
opportunity to acquire authentic information about such measures
and accordingly to protect and adjust their activities or alternatively
to seek modification of such measures. 49
This is a significant interpretation because very few of the
disciplines in GATT are generally thought to encompass persons and
enterprises of domestic nationality vis-à-vis their own government. 50
Here the Appellate Body recognizes the fundamental nature of the
transparency principle in GATT Article X:2 and its importance to
private persons and enterprises on both sides of a transborder

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/distab_e.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004)
(reversing the panel and holding that the discipline in Article X:3(a) applies only to
the administration of laws, regulations, etc., not to the laws and regulations
themselves). In a subsequent case, the Appellate Body explained that complaints
about the “substantive content” of national trade rules would not come within the
scope of Article X. European Communities – Measures Affecting the Importation of
Certain Poultry Products, Report of Appellate Body, WT/DS69/AB/R, para. 115
(adopted July 13, 1998), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/69abre.pdf (last
visited Nov. 3, 2004) [hereinafter EC Poultry Appellate Body Report].
47. EC Poultry Appellate Body Report, supra note 46, paras. 113-15.
48. United States – Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre
Underwear, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS24/AB/R, at 21 (adopted Feb. 25,
1997), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/distab_e.htm (last visited Nov. 3,
2004) [hereinafter U.S. Cotton Underwear Appellate Body Report].
49. Id.
50. JACKSON, supra note 32, at 187.
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transaction.51 Moreover, the Appellate Body sees a “due process”
dimension to transparency, and seems to suggest that Article X has
implications not only for WTO Members but also for “other persons”
who should have a reasonable opportunity to acquire the information
about a customs measure that will enable them either to adjust
their activities or to go to a government “to seek modification of such
measures.” 52 This is the first caselaw of the WTO to explicitly make
the connection between information transparency for the public and
the ability of the affected individual to act on the information by
participating in a government’s administrative review process. 53
The Appellate Body returned to GATT Article X in the United
States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products
case. 54 At issue was whether the U.S. import ban on shrimp could be
justified under the General Exceptions in GATT Article XX.55 Sua
sponte, the Appellate Body stated that GATT Article X:3 could aid in
the interpretation of Article XX because Article X:3 “establishes
certain minimum standards for transparency and procedural
fairness in the administration of trade regulations . . . . “56 The issue
of procedural fairness had arisen because the Appellate Body had
found that the U.S. government denied “basic fairness and due
process” to foreign governments applying for certification under the
U.S. shrimp-turtle regulation.57
The transparency and review principles in GATT Article X
served as an inspiration to governments in the drafting of analogous
provisions in many of the new Uruguay Round agreements for goods,
services, and intellectual property.58 For example, the provisions in
GATT Articles X:1 and X:2 on publication are reflected in Article 7
(Transparency) of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures,59 in Article III (Transparency) of the

51. U.S. Cotton Underwear Appellate Body Report, supra note 48, at 21.
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/58abr.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004)
[hereinafter U.S. Shrimp Appellate Body Report]; see also Armin von Bogdandy,
Legitimacy of International Economic Governance: Interpretive Approaches to WTO
Law and the Prospects of its Proceduralization, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
GOVERNANCE AND N ON-ECONOMIC C ONCERNS 103, 131 (Stefan Griller ed., 2003)
(discussing the Appellate Body’s rulings on GATT Article X).
55. U.S. Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 54, paras. 1, 98.
56. Id. para. 183.
57. Id. para. 181.
58. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
15,
1994,
33
I.L.M.
1144
(1994),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004)
[hereinafter WTO Agreement].
59. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, WTO
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General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),60 in Article 12 of the
Customs Valuation Agreement,61 and in Article 63 (Transparency) of
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (“TRIPS”).62 The provisions in GATT Article X:3(b) on
independent review are reflected, for example, in Article 13 (Judicial
Review) of the Antidumping Agreement, 63 in GATS Article VI:2(a), 64
and in TRIPS Article 41.4. 65
In one important area, however, the governments drafting the
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
(“WTO Agreement”)66 went beyond the transparency principles in
GATT Article X to develop a new participation principle for the
WTO. 67 Under this principle, private economic actors should have a
right to participate in the making of designated types of trade policy
at the national level. The need for enhancing such participation had
been recommended by the “Leutwiler Group” report of 1985, and
that recommendation may have influenced the drafting of the WTO
Agreement over the next several years. 68
Agreement, Annex 1A, art. 7 (1994), http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15sps.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004) [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
60. General Agreement on Trade in Services, WTO Agreement, Annex 1B, art. III
(1994), http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004)
[hereinafter GATS].
61. Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs
and
Trade
1994,
WTO
Agreement,
Annex
1A,
art.
12,
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/20-val_01_e.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004)
(known as the “Customs Valuation Agreement”).
62. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO
Agreement, Annex 1C, art. 63, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
63. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, art. 13 (1994),
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004)
[hereinafter Antidumping Agreement].
64. GATS, supra note 60, art. VI, para. 2(a).
65. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 62, art. 41, para. 4. See Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement
System 1948–1996: An Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE
GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 3, 72-74 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed.,
1997), for a discussion on judicial review in WTO law. The issue of judicial review at
the national level is separable from transparency and participation, and is too large
an issue to be covered here.
66. See WTO Agreement, supra note 58.
67. Robert Wolfe, Regulatory Transparency, Developing Countries and the WTO,
2 WORLD TRADE REV. 157, 161 (2003).
68. See GATT, TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER FUTURE: PROPOSALS FOR ACTION 36
(1985) (suggesting that all countries develop organizations in which interested
parties and consumers can express their views on trade policy actions before
decisions are made). This report was written by a seven-man eminent persons group
chaired by Fritz Leutwiler, a noted Swiss and international banker.
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Provisions to provide private participatory rights and
opportunities at the national level are present in many of WTO subagreements. 69 For example, the Agreement on Safeguards states that
a government’s investigation shall provide for public hearings (or
other appropriate means) in which importers, exporters, and other
interested parties can present evidence and their views. 70 The GATS
states that where appropriate, WTO Members “shall work in
cooperation with relevant intergovernmental and nongovernmental
organisations towards the establishment and adoption of common
international standards and criteria for recognition” for the practice
of relevant services trades and professions. 71 The Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) provides that before adopting a
standard, a national standardizing body is to allow a period of at
least 60 days for interested parties to submit comments on the draft
standard (unless urgent problems arise).72 Furthermore, the
standardizing body is required to “take into account” such
comments. 73 The Antidumping Agreement has an Article on “Public
Notice and Explanation of Determinations” and also requires that
the antidumping adjudication provide opportunities for interested
parties to provide evidence and for consumer organizations to provide
information.74 WTO member governments have gone even further in
providing for private participatory rights in the context of accession
agreements whereby governments join the WTO. 75 The most

69. None of these WTO provisions provide for participation in the national
legislative process.
70. Agreement on Safeguards, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, art. 3.1 (1994),
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
71. GATS, supra note 60, art. VII, para. 5.
72. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade [hereinafter TBT Agreement], WTO
Agreement, Annex 1A, Annex 3, Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption,
and
Application
of
Standards,
para.
L
(1994),
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004)
(requiring interested parties to be within the territory of a WTO member country)
[hereinafter Code of Good Practice]. The WTO has published a booklet on the TBT’s
transparency requirements. See WTO Secretariat, Transparency Provisions of the
TBT
Agreement,
April
2002,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/booklet_transparency_e.doc (last visited
Nov. 3, 2004).
73. Code of Good Practice, supra note 72, para. N. These obligations inure to
bodies that have accepted the Code and WTO member governments are responsible for
assuring that central government standardizing bodies accept the Code. TBT
Agreement, supra note 72, art. 4.
74. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 63, arts. 6.1.2, 6.12, 12.
75. See, e.g., Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Cambodia,
WT/ACC/KHM/21,
para.
216
(Aug.
15,
2003),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm (last visited Nov. 3,
2004).
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expansive demands came in the negotiations with China.76 As Julia
Ya Qin has pointed out, China agreed to provide an opportunity for
public comment on all new draft laws and regulations affecting
trade. 77 Qin notes that this “mandatory public comment period
clearly exceeds the requirements of existing WTO rules.”78
In summary, with regard to its oversight of national trade and
trade-related regulation, WTO law requires governments to
maintain a large degree of transparency and some degree of
participation for the benefit of traders and other interested persons. 79
This law demonstrates an acknowledgement by governments that
transparency and participation are important ingredients in good
governance at the national level.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSPARENCY NORMS WITHIN THE WTO
Unfortunately, WTO member governments have adopted a
different and inconsistent position with regard to norms for WTO
transparency and to the participation of nonstate actors in the policy
and rulemaking activities of the WTO. 80 Although the text of the
WTO Agreement does not require that WTO negotiations be kept
confidential and does not forbid participatory opportunities for the
public, the WTO has often insisted on secrecy and resisted
participation by social and economic actors.81 That said, it needs to
be noted that the zone of secrecy and insularity has continued to
narrow since the WTO was born in 1995. 82 Still, a great deal of room
for improvement exists.
Let me briefly summarize the current practices of the WTO
regarding transparency and participation. The WTO website has
many download options and features a huge collection of documents

76. See Julia Ya Qin, “WTO-Plus” Obligations and Their Implications for the
World Trade Organization Legal System, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 483, 491-93 (2003)
(noting the WTO negotiations with China).
77. Id. at 493.
78. Id.
79. Cf. Peter M. Gerhart, The Two Constitutional Visions of the World Trade
Organization, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 61 (2003) (“It is no exaggeration to say that
the WTO treaties form a kind of Administrative Procedure Act for foreigners who
might be adversely affected by government action.”) (footnote omitted).
80. See Frank Loy, Public Participation in the World Trade Organization, in THE
R OLE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 113, 119-21 (Gary
P. Sampson ed., 2001).
81. See Julio A. Lacarte, Transparency, Public Debate and Participation by NGOs
in the WTO: A WTO Perspective, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 683, 683-84 (2004).
82. See, e.g., Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction of WTO Documents,
WT/L/452
(May
14,
2002),
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/bernie_derestrictiontext_e.htm
(last
visited Nov. 3, 2004).
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available without charge.83 For WTO legislative activities, the main
exclusions are draft negotiating texts and some analyses prepared
by the Secretariat.84 For WTO judicial activities, the main exclusions
are the government briefs to the panels and Appellate Body,
interlocutory procedural rulings, and the panel’s interim report. 85
Most documents are posted in a timely manner except for minutes of
various WTO meetings which tend to lag a few months. Other than
plenary sessions of WTO Ministerial Conferences, all official WTO
meetings are closed to the private sector and nongovernmental
organizations (“NGOs”).86 Over the past decade, however, the WTO
Secretariat has organized a number of seminars, symposia, and
workshops in which accredited NGOs and business representatives
participate.87
With regard to dispute settlement, all oral hearings of WTO
panels and the Appellate Body are closed to the public.88 On many
occasions in recent years, NGOs and private individuals have
submitted unsolicited amicus curiae briefs to panels and the
Appellate Body.89 Subsequent to the Appellate Body’s landmark
decision in 1998 in favor of the admissibility of amicus curiae

83. See http://www.wto.org. See also HETTY KOVACH ET AL., ONE WORLD TRUST, THE
GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: POWER WITHOUT ACCOUNTABILITY? 15 (2003),
available at http://www.oneworldtrust.org/htmlGAP/report/report.htm (last visited
Nov. 3, 2004), which rated the WTO second among the reviewed international
organizations for access to online information.
84. The “JOBS” document series, covering negotiations, are not released by the
WTO. See http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=advanced (last
visited Nov. 3, 2004) (By selecting “Advanced Search” and entering “Jobs” in
“Collection” field, one will reach an error page that indicates that this document “is
not yet available to the public.”).
85. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 1226, arts. 4.6, 13.1, 14.1, 17.10, 18.2
(1994), http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004)
[hereinafter DSU]. A panel’s interim report is not made public, but the final report
discusses any changes made to the interim report following review and comment by
the parties. In practice, the decision reached in an interim report is often leaked to
the press. See, e.g., Gambling Ban Struck Down, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2004, at E2
(reporting on interim ruling in U.S. online gambling case).
86. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 145 (2001) (“The virtual
entirety of WTO proceedings are closed to public view.”).
87. See, e.g., WORLD TRADE ORG., WORKSHOP ON D OMESTIC REGULATION PROGRAMME
(Mar.
29-30,
2004),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/workshop_march04_e/workshop_program
me_march04_e.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004) (detailing an agenda of a workshop held
by the WTO Secretariat on domestic regulation that included presentation by persons
from International Bar Associations, the International Union of Architects, the
International Council of Nurses, and the European Express Association).
88. WALLACH & WOODALL, supra note 3, at 245.
89. DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 35-36 (2nd ed. 2004).
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briefs, 90 a common practice is that the Appellate Body will consider
accepting an amicus brief, yet will not take it into account in deciding
the case.91 The panel practice is more variable. A trend that may be
developing is that the panel makes a preliminary ruling that it will
consider arguments in an amicus curiae brief only to the extent that
the argument is voiced by one of the governmental parties. 92
The WTO Agreement, Article V:2, provides authority to the
WTO General Council to “make appropriate arrangements for
consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations
concerned with matters related to those of the WTO.” 93 Article V:2
was based on a similar institutional provision in the ITO Charter,94
which was modeled on one in the U.N. Charter.95 The WTO General
Council implemented Article V:2 in 1996 by enacting Guidelines for
Arrangements with NGOs. 96
These Guidelines delineate a narrow role for NGOs based on the
following rationale:
As a result of extensive discussions, there is currently a
broadly held view that it would not be possible for NGOs to
be directly involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings.

90. See U.S. Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 54, paras. 104-10
(explaining the admissibility of amicus curiae briefs). The trend to accept NGO
participation in intergovernmental litigation was first reported on by Dinah Shelton.
See Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in
International Judicial Proceedings, 88 A M. J. INT’L L. 611, 616 (1994) (noting the
positive development in the acceptance of amicus participation by NGOs in
international cases).
91. See, e.g., United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain HotRolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United
Kingdom, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS138/AB/R, para. 42 (adopted May 10,
2000), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/2340d.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004)
(where the Appellate Body found it unnecessary to take the amicus curiae briefs into
account, but held they had the authority to do so).
92. See United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect
to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, Report of the Panel, WT/DS257/R, para. 7.1
n. 75 (adopted Feb. 17, 2004), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/257r_a_e.doc
(last visited Nov. 3, 2004) [hereinafter Softwood Lumber Final Determination].
93. WTO Agreement, supra note 58, art. V, para. 2.
94. See Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment:
Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Mar. 24, 1948, art. 87, para. 2,
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004)
[hereinafter Havana Charter for an ITO].
95. U.N. CHARTER art. 71. As Susan Aaronson points out, “[a]lthough the
architects of the ITO provided for a role for civil society, the GATT bureaucracy
turned insular.” SUSAN ARIEL AARONSON, TAKING TRADE TO THE STREETS: THE LOST
HISTORY OF PUBLIC EFFORTS TO SHAPE GLOBALIZATION 54 (2001).
96. Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental
Organizations,
WT/L/162
(July
23,
1996),
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/guide_e.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004)
[hereinafter NGO Guidelines].
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Closer consultation and cooperation with NGOs can also be
met constructively through appropriate processes at the
national level where lies primary responsibility for taking
into account the different elements of public interest which
are brought to bear on trade policy-making. 97

The General Council did not seek to explain why governments
held that view and why they thought that the WTO was different
from other international organizations where it is possible for NGOs
to be directly involved in ongoing work and to observe it firsthand.
Furthermore, the Council did not explain why the national level has
the primary responsibility to take into account different elements of
the public interest on trade policymaking, and if so, what remains as
the raison d’être of the WTO. The narrowness of the assumption
undergirding the Guidelines shows that a great deal more
transparency and inclusion could be achieved by the WTO without
having to renegotiate the treaty.
What would be the rationale for such a reform? In my view, the
different positions espoused by the WTO for states and for itself
cannot be reconciled. Prescribing outwardly to the national level, the
WTO pushes the boundaries of international law regarding the need
for transparency and participation. Yet in self-government, the WTO
resists adopting features of transparency and participation practiced
in other international organizations.
That inconsistent stance is troubling. Simply put, the WTO
should practice what it preaches. The “principle of fundamental
importance” articulated by the Appellate Body in the Cotton
Underwear case that WTO members “and other persons affected, or
likely to be affected, by governmental measures . . . should have a
reasonable opportunity to acquire authentic information about such
measures and accordingly to protect and adjust their activities or
alternatively to seek modification of such measures” applies just as
much to WTO measures as it does to national measures. 98
The position expressed in the Guidelines that NGOs should
limit their participation to the national level is based on an orthodox
view of international relations. The key assumption is that states
are the only relevant actors in international relations and that
states should speak with a unitary voice to each other. Within each
state, it is entirely appropriate for the ruling government to solicit
the views of domestic (or foreign) actors in the setting of trade
policy.99 At the WTO, however, it is thought that the flow of ideas

97. Id. para. VI.
98. U.S. Cotton Underwear Appellate Body Report, supra note 48, at 21.
99. See Brian Hocking, Changing the Terms of Trade Policy Making: From the
“Club” to the “Multistakeholder Model,” 3 WORLD TRADE REV. 3 (2004) (discussing
new developments in modes of participation at the national level).
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has to be channeled through member governments.
In my view, this position may be coherent in the abstract, but is
inappropriate for life on a planet that shares a common environment
and increasingly, a common economy and social community. By
denying the opportunity for NGOs to observe and participate more in
WTO activities, the WTO is undermining its opportunity to promote
greater transparency, participation, and accountability at the
national level. Certainly, the WTO sets a bad example. Even worse,
the WTO’s reputation for secretiveness and single-mindedness may
make it harder to maintain public support for the world trading
system.
For instance, in the United States, the 2002 law providing trade
promotion authority passed the U.S. House of Representatives by
three votes.100 That law sets U.S. objectives for WTO negotiations,
and one objective, on “Transparency,” calls for “public access for
appropriate meetings, proceedings, and submissions” to and at the
WTO. 101 If this U.S. objective remains unrequited, then future
Congressional votes regarding the WTO may not go as positively.
A. Administrative Law at the WTO102
The politics aside, some conceptual issues call for attention. A
core question is whether the WTO’s requirements for publication,
notice and comment, and judicial review at the national level are
relevant principles to be applied reflexively to the intergovernmental
WTO. Similar requirements at the national level are generally
understood as a means to promote the accountability of and
democratic control over administrative agencies operating with
delegated authority from lawmakers. But is the WTO an
international administrative agency to which such principles might
logically be applied?
The WTO does not lend itself to easy typologies, but in my view,
it can be seen as an international administrative agency. The
member governments that established the WTO endowed it with
“such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its
100. Rossella Brevetti et al., Trade Policy: Senate Set to Clear Trade Package After
House Approves Bill by 3 Votes, INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA), Aug. 1, 2002, at 1334.
101. Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2102(b)(5)(B), 116 Stat. 933, 996 (2002).
102. In this article, I do not explore the connection between the changing vision of
the WTO’s responsibilities and the broader issue of the responsibility of
international organizations for following general international law. For an
introduction to the issue of the responsibility of international organizations, see JAN
KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 14 (2002). In
addition, I do not discuss the most common concern of international administrative
law regarding the law governing how an international organization treats its
employees. See C. WILFRED JENKS, THE PROPER LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS 27-33 (1962); C.F. A MERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ch. 11 (1996).
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functions,” and also provided that WTO officials would have the
privileges and immunities necessary for the “independent exercise” of
their functions.103 The main functions of the WTO are to “facilitate
the implementation, administration and operation, and further the
objectives” of the WTO Agreement, and to “provide the forum for
[trade]negotiations.” 104 During the course of trade negotiations, the
WTO Members may agree to make amendments to WTO law and to
the schedules containing national commitments on trade in goods
and services.105
Some might resist the notion of the WTO as an administrative
agency on the grounds that it is a legislative body, but that claim is
weak. Because trade negotiations are so central to the WTO’s
mission, the WTO could be characterized as an international
legislature. As a legislature, however, the WTO has an unusual
decision rule. In general, any action by the WTO requires
consensus. 106 Moreover, even after an amendment to the WTO is
approved, that amendment has to be accepted by a member
government before becoming binding on that government.107 Thus,
member governments do not transfer or cede lawmaking power to
the WTO.
On the other hand, some might embrace the notion of the WTO
as an administrative agency on the false grounds that governments
delegate decisionmaking authority to it, yet such a claim is
mistaken. 108 A state cannot delegate authority that it does not have
and none of the international functions of the WTO are
accomplishable by a solitary state. What has happened instead is
that governments have established and joined the WTO, agreed to
abstain from practices that violate WTO law, and assigned the WTO
certain functions for promoting trade cooperation.109 The governments
have also assigned adjudicatory and compliance functions to the

103. See WTO Agreement, supra note 58, art. VIII, paras. 1, 3; Michael N. Barnett &
Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International
Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699 (1999) (viewing international organizations as
purposive actors).
104. See WTO Agreement, supra note 58, art. III, paras. 1, 2.
105. See, e.g., WTO Agreement, supra note 58, art. X; GATT, supra note 34, art.
XXVIII bis; GATS, supra note 60, art. XIX.
106. See WTO Agreement, supra note 58, art. IX, para. 1 (calling for
decisionmaking by consensus but also providing for majoritarian decisionmaking).
107. WTO Agreement, supra note 58, art. X. The only exception is amendments to
certain provisions in GATS which may become binding on all Members “upon
acceptance by two-thirds of the Members.” Id. art. X. para. 5. Waivers of WTO law can
be approved by three-fourths of the Members. Id. art. IX, para. 3.
108. For an analysis of international delegations from a U.S. perspective, see
Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 C OLUM. L.
REV. 1492 (2004).
109. WTO Agreement, supra note 58, arts. I, III, XI, para. 1, XII, para. 1, XVI, para. 4.
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WTO Dispute Settlement Body and its panels and Appellate Body.110
Although some might argue that governments have delegated judicial
(or quasi-judicial) authority to the Appellate Body, that claim is
faulty because there was no pre-existing national jurisdiction to
adjudicate a foreign government’s compliance with WTO law. 111
Instead, the governments have created a judicial function at the
WTO.
The feature of the WTO that most renders it an administrative
agency is that the principals—that is, the Members—have given the
WTO competence as their joint agent to carry out certain discrete
international functions. Because the Members are incorporeal, they
must act through various agents including WTO “officials” and “the
representatives of the Members.”112 Within each government, the
representative of that Member tends to be an Executive official.113
Thus, from the perspective of a national legislature, the WTO
resembles an administrative agency in the sense that it makes
decisions that affect a domestic polity and yet extend beyond the
direct legislative control of national elected officials. 114
It is that similarity to the domestic agency that forms the basis
for the application of administrative law principles to the WTO
itself. Just as a legislature would impose administrative law on a
domestic agency to make it more fair, transparent, and accountable,
that legislature could conceptualize a similar role for the application
of administrative law principles to the WTO. 115 In doing so, the
legislature (or the electorate) might have two targets in mind: one
will be the WTO and its decisionmaking. The other will be the
government’s own representatives to the WTO for which WTO
secrecy may present a barrier to effective parliamentary (and public)
110. Id. art. IV, para. 3; DSU, supra note 85.
111. With respect to a foreign government, there would be a problem of sovereign
immunity of governmental acts. RESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §
451 (1987). I read the WTO DSU as implicitly preserving for Member A the judicial
power to determine whether A is in compliance with the WTO treaty. See DSU, supr a
note 85, arts. 23.1, 23.2(a). Nevertheless, I am not aware of any WTO Member where a
national court is routinely reviewing whether that Member government (or a
subnational government) stands in compliance with WTO law.
112. See WTO Agreement, supra note 58, art. VIII, para. 3.
113. In some countries, the representative to the WTO Ministerial Council is an
elected parliamentarian—for example, Mark Vaile, the Australian Trade Minister.
114. See OXFAM, RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE STANDARDS: TRADE, GLOBALIZATION,
AND THE FIGHT A GAINST POVERTY 255 (2002) (“The problem is that most governments
can enter into agreements at the WTO without sufficient reference to public opinion
or parliamentary scrutiny, even though those agreements often involve important
constraints on national policy.”).
115. See Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming
Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 A M. J. INT’L L. 596, 619 (1999)
(suggesting that administrative procedure requirements at the international level
“have the potential to serve the same legitimating functions as they do domestically”).
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oversight.116
Since each WTO Member’s interaction with the WTO is carried
out through bureaucrats, diplomats, and occasionally ministers,
there is a continuing need to achieve accountability for the authority
that diplomatic and bureaucratic agents exercise at the WTO. 117 The
most obvious context for such accountability is the chain from the
agent in Geneva to elected officials at home and then outward to the
national citizenry. Yet in a world economy and in an organization
like the WTO that operates by consensus, more inclusive and
complex chains of accountability may be desirable.118
Legal analysts have not yet developed adequate frameworks for
understanding
the
accountability
of
intergovernmental
decisionmaking
beyond
governments
to
extragovernmental
stakeholders wherever they are situated. 119 Although the norms
intrinsic to national-level democracy may not be directly applicable to
116. See Paul B. Stephan, International Governance and American Democracy, 1
C HI. J. INT’L L. 237, 250 (2000) (stating that the secrecy of international organizations
makes it hard to monitor government action). This problem would be reduced if
governments maintained the same transparency with respect to actions abroad as they
do with respect to actions in the homeland. Allott has suggested that accountability
expectations accompany a government as it operates internationally. PHILIP ALLOTT,
THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: S OCIETY AND LAW BEYOND THE STATE 378 (2002) (“When a
government exercises public-realm power externally, in relation to other
governments, including in the forming of intergovernmental societies, it carries with
it the constitutional conditions on the exercise of that power.”).
117. Howse points out several ways in which WTO processes tend to loosen the
accountability of agents in Geneva to the principals back home. For example, the
bunching of decisions into a large package makes it harder for national legislatures to
reject what negotiators have achieved. Robert Howse, How To Begin To Think about
the ‘Democratic Deficit’ at the WTO, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND
N ON-ECONOMIC C ONCERNS, supra note 54, at 79, 86-87.
118. See A NN FLORINI, THE COMING DEMOCRACY 87-88 (2003) (stating that the direct
participation of interested people in intergovernmental organizations is a means of
overcoming the principal-agent problem); Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye Jr., The
Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and the Problems of Democratic Legitimacy,
in EFFICIENCY, E QUITY, AND LEGITIMACY. THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE
MILLENNIUM 264, 291 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001) (contending that the
involvement of NGOs in international regimes may enhance accountability); Robert
Post, Constitutional Law: The Challenge of Globalization to American Public Law
Scholarship, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 323, 327 (2001) (suggesting that the national frame
for constitutional and administrative law may be inadequate for international
organizations such as the WTO); Americo Beviglia Zampetti, Democratic Legitimacy
in the World Trade Organization: The Justice Dimension, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 105, 110
(2003) (explaining that democratic legitimacy in international institutions “cannot be
guaranteed only through legitimate and democratic decision-making within each
participating state”).
119. For recent work seeking to develop administrative law principles for the
international level, see Giacinto della Cananea, Beyond the State: The
Europeanization and Globalization of Procedural Administrative Law, 9 EUROP.
PUB. L. 563 (2003); Sabino Cassese, Shrimp, Turtles and Procedure: Global Standards
for National Administration (2004) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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the international level,120 they may nevertheless help in thinking
through an appropriate and effective process for international
governance.121 Indeed, two different ideas—the pluralist and the civic
republican—may be relevant. The pluralist will seek to open up
governance and to provide opportunities for the participation of
dueling interest groups in the decisionmaking process; the civic
republican will seek governance decisions that relate to a public
value discovered through deliberation.122 Both concepts infuse the
ongoing debate about WTO transparency and participation of NGOs
in the trading system. 123
120. See John O. McGinnis, The Appropriate Hierarchy of Global Multilateralism
and Customary International Law: The Example of the WTO, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 229,
245-46 (2003) (stating that “[b]ecause democratic states can pit the views of one faction
against another[,] . . . they continue to provide the best mechanisms for distilling the
will of peoples around the world and converting it into a world legal order”); Joseph
H.H. Weiler & Iulia Motoc, Taking Democracy Seriously; The Normative Challenge
to the International Legal System, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND
N ON-ECONOMIC C ONCERNS, supra note 54, at 47, 70 (suggesting that “there is no
demos underlying international governance”); MARTIN WOLF, WHY GLOBALIZATION
WORKS 209 (2004) (stating that “the place for democratic accountability is [in] the
legislatures” of WTO member governments).
121. See Jost Delbrück, Transnational Federalism: Problems and Prospects of
Allocating Public Authority Beyond the State, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 31, 54
(2004) (stating that NGOs “can play an important role as entities that promote
transparency of transnational decisionmaking processes and thereby strengthen the
accountability of the different public authorities”).
122. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL,
A DMINISTRATIVE LAW PROCESS 26-29 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing democratic theory at
the national level).
123. See, e.g., Wolfgang Benedek, Relations of the WTO with Other International
Organizations and NGOs, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW WITH A HUMAN FACE 479,
493 (Friedl Weiss et al. eds., 1998) (positing a representation function for NGOs);
JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 224 (2004) (stating that NGOs will
often act to empower less powerful constituencies and to bring their voices into play
when their votes do not accomplish this); ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 117 (1998)
(doubting the possibility of a democratization of international organizations and
suggesting that international decisions will be made by bargaining among elites,
including nongovernmental bureaucracies); Robert Howse, The Legitimacy of the
World Trade Organization, in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
355, 362 (Jean-Marc Coicaud et al. eds., 2001) (stating that “international civil society
may underpin deliberative democracy at the [international] level”); GREGORY C.
SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS (2003) (discussing transnational private sector
coalitions seeking to influence national trade policy and the WTO); Daniel C. Esty,
Non-governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation,
Competition, or Exclusion, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 123, 131 (1998) [hereinafter NGOs at the
WTO] (“Permitting NGOs to participate in WTO discussions thus might allow the
organization to hear important voices which would otherwise be unrepresented or
under-represented in Geneva.”) (footnote omitted); Daniel C. Esty, Linkages and
Governance: NGOs at the World Trade Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 709,
721 (1998) (suggesting that “NGOs force government[s] . . . to reassess and justify their
own policy choices”); David Henderson, WTO 2002: Imaginary Crisis, Real Problems,
1 WORLD TRADE REV. 277, 285-86 (2002) (arguing that the WTO should exclude
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The traditional administrative law model fits the WTO in some
respects, yet fails to fit when it comes to judicial review of WTO
actions. What fits is that principals at the national level can
demand that WTO-level rulemaking and adjudications be
appropriately transparent and adhere to accepted norms of due
process. Where a gap exists is that there is no international judicial
control on the WTO as an administrative agency, and so that central
dimension of administrative law is absent. This issue is not as new
as it may seem. 124 The idea of judicial review of the multilateral
trading system was discussed in the United Nations economic
negotiations of 1946-48, and a provision was included in the ITO to
permit Members to ask the International Court of Justice for an
advisory opinion regarding a decision by the ITO Conference of all
Members. 125 Because the ITO did not go into force, this provision was
never used. Nevertheless, one of the U.S. negotiators, Seymour
Rubin—later a highly-respected figure in the community of U.S.
international
lawyers126—anticipated
that
the
“growth
of
international administrative agencies” would eventually draw upon
legal developments at the domestic level in administrative law and
outsiders from the negotiating process so that governments can overcome
protectionist interests at home); Markus Krajewski, Democratic Legitimacy and
Constitutional Perspectives of WTO Law, 35 J. WORLD TRADE, February 2001, at 167,
177 (pointing out that the WTO decisionmaking process is dominated by bargaining
instead of arguing); John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade
Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 571-72 (2000) (arguing that NGO access to the
WTO “would undermine the key benefits of a properly constructed international
trade regime[, namely] mechanisms [to] reduce the power of interest groups in order
to permit trade and democracy to flourish”); Philip M. Nichols, Realism, Liberalism,
Values, and the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L E CON. LAW. 851, 854-55
(1996) (criticizing study by Steve Charnovitz for not explaining why international
interest groups are not already represented at the WTO through national
governments); Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 401,
416 (2000) (suggesting that interest groups be allowed to follow suit as the “locus of
political decision-making increasingly shifts upwards”). For one of the earliest
articles on this topic see Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and
Participation by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L
ECON. L. 359 (1996). For the debate in the broader context, see Francesca Bignami,
Three Generations of Participation Rights in European Administrative Proceedings,
Jean
Monnet
Working
Paper
11/03,
available
at
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/papers03.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2004)
(discussing the debate about transparency and criticizing the notion of a
representational role for civil society associations in European Community
administration).
124. Seymour J. Rubin, The Judicial Review Problem in the International Trade
Organization, 63 HARV. L. REV. 78, 79 (1949).
125. Id.; Havana Charter for an ITO, supra note 94, art. 96, para. 2. The ITO was to be
bound by the Advisory Opinion. Havana Charter for an ITO, supra note 94, art. 96,
para. 5.
126. Stephen M. Schwebel, Seymour J. Rubin (1914–2003), 97 A M. J. INT’L L. 310
(2003).
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judicial review.127
B. Improving WTO Transparency and Participation
The question of whether individuals and NGOs should be able
to observe and participate in the WTO is highly contested.128 In my
view, the position espoused in the WTO Guidelines—namely, that
the participation of individuals and NGOs in trade policymaking
should occur only at the national level—is undesirable on ethical as
well as pragmatic grounds. Let me briefly note six reasons
underlying my conclusion.
First, the notion that citizen views should be channeled only
through WTO member governments disadvantages individuals who
live in countries that are not democratic.129 The General Council’s
Guidelines suggest that the national level has the primary
responsibility for taking into account the different elements of public
interest which are brought to bear on trade policy-making, and yet
the WTO treaty does not convey a responsibility for member
governments to be democratic.130 The Guidelines might make more
sense if all WTO member governments had robust democratic
accountability. Unfortunately, however, many do not. For example,
Angola, Bahrain, China, Congo, Cuba, The Gambia, Haiti,
Myanmar, Oman, Qatar, Rwanda, and Uganda are among WTO
member countries that do not appear on Freedom House’s 2003 list
of electoral democracies.131 In response to this point about non127. Rubin, supra note 124, at 79, 97-98.
128. See, e.g., CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY. THE
FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 135–42 (2001); KENT JONES, WHO ’ S
AFRAID OF THE WTO? ch. 9 (2004); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The WTO in Transition: Of
Constituents, Competence and Coherence, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’ L L. REV. 979, 984-87
(2001); KENT JONES, WHO ’ S A FRAID OF THE WTO? ch. 9 (2004).
129. See Jeffrey Atik, Democratizing the WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’ L L. REV. 451,
460–61, 465, 472 (2001).
130. See WTO Agreement, supra note 58, arts. XI, para. 1, XII, para. 2; Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, Constitutionalism and WTO Law: From a State-Centered Approach
Towards a Human Rights Approach in International Economic Law, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF R OBERT E.
HUDEC 32, 62 (Daniel L.M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002) (noting that the
GATT and WTO have never scrutinized the agency relationship between governments
and citizens); Bruce Stokes & Pat Choate, Democratizing U.S. Trade Policy, C OUNCIL
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 2001, at 67 (noting that most WTO Members do not have full
transparency, open meetings, and conflict of interest provisions back home),
available
at
http://www.cfr.org/pub4150/bruce_stokes_pat_choate/democratizing_us_trade_policy.p
hp (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
131. FREEDOM
H OUSE,
ELECTORAL
DEMOCRACIES,
available
at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/democracies.pdf (last visited
Nov. 3, 2004). See WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE ORGANIZATION - GEMBERS AND
OBSERVERS,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm
(last
visited Nov. 3, 2004), for a list of the current WTO membership.
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democratic states at the WTO, Philip Nichols has retorted that the
factors that preclude constituent “participation at the national level
will also preclude participation at the international level.”132 In my
view, Nichols is too pessimistic on that point.
Second, the lack of openness toward NGOs disenfranchises
individuals who live in countries that have not yet been allowed to
join the WTO. 133 For example, many people live in WTO-applicant
countries such as Belarus, Ethiopia, the Russian Federation, Saudi
Arabia, Sudan, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen. 134 None of that
population has any direct representation in WTO policymaking.135
This is also true for WTO accession negotiations in which the WTO
negotiates the terms for a country to join the WTO, 136 without
making any effort to seek the views of interested parties in that
country. One wonders how the denizens of non-democratic countries
feel about the WTO’s disinterest in consulting them.
Third, the WTO’s weaknesses in external transparency and
participation are especially disabling for individuals from nonpowerful countries. Even when those countries—which tend to be in
the South rather than the North—have perfect democracies, the
views of citizens and constituents have to be routed to the WTO
through a government which may be too weak to have its voice heard
or heeded.137 In contemporary WTO practice, weak governments are
often marginalized in WTO decisionmaking.138 Thus, the current
WTO system of listening to the views of NGOs only through their
governments privileges citizens of rich, powerful countries. In my
view, the WTO should seek to counterbalance (or at least be neutral
132. Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization
Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 295, 313 (1996)
(discussing standing in WTO dispute settlement).
133. Individuals who live in countries that are not WTO Members have no
government that can represent them at the WTO and therefore no direct way to
influence the WTO or any indirect way through an NGO. See Tina Potuto Kimble, The
World Trade Organization, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY FOR LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
STUDIES, at 10, available at http://www.ngowatch.org/kimble.pdf (last visited Nov. 3,
2004) (noting that NGO seeking to influence the WTO are limited to participation
through their governments).
134. For
a
list
of
applicants
to
the
WTO,
see
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acc_e.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
135. Id.
136. See WTO Agreement, supra note 58, art. XII, para. 1.
137. See Diana Tussie & Miguel F. Lengyel, Developing Countries: Turning
Participation into Influence, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK
ch 47 (Bernard Hoekman et al. eds., 2002).
138. Chee Yoke Ling, Democratic Governance for Sustainable Development, in
TAKING LEADERSHIP IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN THE C ONTEXT OF MULTIPLE ACTORS
AND EVOLVING ISSUES 71, 73 (Tatsuro Kunugi ed., 2004); B.S. Chimni, International
Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 E UR. J. INT’L L. 1, 1920 (2004).
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to) the current assymmetries of national power, rather than reinforce
those imbalances. 139
Fourth, although it is sometimes suggested that the WTO’s
practice of consensus decision-making140 means that individuals who
can convince their own government to take a particular stance in the
WTO can prevent the WTO from taking action in conflict with that
stance,141 this view leaves out the fact that an individual will not
only want to prevent the WTO from doing what she perceives to be
bad, but will also want to get the WTO to achieve good ends.
Persuading one’s own (WTO member) government is a good start to
the task of convincing all 147 WTO member governments. 142 The
most efficient place to conduct such discourse will sometimes be at
the central marketplace for trade policy, that is, at the WTO. Yet
perversely, the WTO General Council continues to insist on a
localization of advocacy activities despite the higher transactions
costs that accrue to individuals and NGOs. 143 The WTO will also be
an advantageous spot for observation of the trade negotiation
process. If an individual wants to monitor how well her own
government is negotiating at the WTO, the best place to do that may
be in Geneva, not in the national capital. 144

139. See Maura Blue Jeffords, Turning the Protester into a Partner for
Development: The Need for Effective Consultation Between the WTO & NGOs, 28
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 937, 965 (2003) (suggesting that a consultative role for “NGOs can
assist developing countries [sic] maximize their power”); Sylvia Ostry, World Trade
Organization: Institutional Design for Better Governance, in EFFICIENCY, E QUITY,
LEGITIMACY, supra note 118, at 361, 366 (noting that NGO networks are helping
developing countries); Naboth van den Broek, Power Paradoxes in Enforcement and
Implementation of World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Reports:
Interdisciplinary Approaches and New Proposals, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 127, 160 (2003)
(suggesting that greater WTO transparency and a role for NGOs could help smaller
countries). But see Maki Tanaka, Bridging the Gap Between Northern NGOs and
Southern Sovereigns in the Trade-Environment Debate: The Pursuit of Democratic
Dispute Settlements in the WTO Under the Rio Principles, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 113, 14344 (2003) (arguing that southern NGOs are generally disinterested in promoting
direct NGO participation in the WTO because that would favor Northern NGOs).
140. WTO Agreement, supra note 58, art. IX, para. 1.
141. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 303, 338 (2004) (“States need not worry that policies will be forced upon them. To
the extent that national decision makers are democratically accountable, therefore,
they serve as guardians of the interests of their citizens.”).
142. See PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD 75 (2nd ed. 2002) (criticizing the WTO website
for saying that consensus decision-making is more democratic than majority rule and
explaining that consensus decision-making favors the status quo).
143. See NGO Guidelines, supra note 96. Higher transaction costs are likely to
ensue when an NGO from WTO Member N 1 has to devise lobbying strategies for
decentralized lobbying in Members N 1 to N 148 rather than at the WTO headquarters in
Geneva.
144. See Howse, supra note 117, at 89 (stating that the presence of NGO monitoring
at the level of negotiations can help to reduce agency costs).
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Fifth, by conceptualizing the trade debate as being decentered
within national units, the WTO reinforces the tendencies of economic
nationalism to dominate trade policy.145 The “different elements of
public interest which are brought to bear on trade policy-making” at
the national level tend to be dominated by the financial interests of
import-competing industries. 146 Other elements of the public
interest—including volitions for free trade, environmental protection
or the alleviation of world poverty—may be disadvantaged in a
debate that is purposefully segmented by homeland.
Furthermore, the attitude reflected in the WTO’s NGO
Guidelines seems to assume that the trade debate at the national
level should funnel in only internal views, and that WTO itself
should refuse to hear views not pronounced by a government. 147 Yet
that attitude takes away the voice of transnational associations. 148
Such a parochial stance is ironic. Back in 1923, participation by the
International Chamber of Commerce was appropriate to help
governments draft the transparency principles in the Customs
Convention, and now eight decades later, in a far more globalized
world, the WTO will not allow NGOs like the International Chamber
of Commerce, Transparency International, or Oxfam to be directly

145. See Judith Goldstein, International Institutions and Domestic Politics:
GATT, WTO, and the Liberalization of International Trade, in THE WTO AS AN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 133, 138–51 (Anne O. Krueger ed. 1998) (discussing the
role of international trade institutions in moderating domestic trade policy).
146. See NGO Guidelines, supra note 96; JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 71–73
(1989).
147. See WTO Secretariat, WTO Policy Issues for Parliamentarians: A Guide to
Current
Trade
Issues
for
Legislators,
2001,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/parliamentarians_e.pdf (last visited Nov. 3,
2004). The Guide states:
Some form of parliamentary assembly represents citizens under most
constitutions. That is where citizens need to exercise their democratic
rights.
....
. . . Only governments can negotiate trade rules for countries. Citizens
are expected to be represented at the WTO through their governments.
....
. . . WTO Members have explained often that governments are the ones
which represent the interests of all their respective citizens.
....
. . . Member governments have repeatedly re-affirmed that they
consider themselves responsible for dialogue with their citizens and for
determining how best to represent the interests of their countries.
Id. at 13-16.
148. August Reinisch & Christina Irgel, The Participation of Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs) in WTO Dispute Settlement System, 1 N ON-S TATE ACTORS &
INT’ L L. 127, 132 (2001) (noting the increase in transnational actors which are unlikely
to be represented by any national government).
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involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings. 149
Sixth, the resistance of the WTO to providing opportunities for a
dialogue with nongovernmental actors reduces the competition of
ideas and reinforces status quo thinking.150 The insulated status quo
may be trade-centric and market-based, or it may be mercantilist
and pro-producer. Regardless of what values dominate on a
particular issue, the debate within the WTO can be truncated
because of limited voices and the lack of an interplay of ideas. To be
sure, there is a robust debate about trade and its implications in
Geneva and throughout the world. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely
that all of the best ideas for trade policymaking get communicated
and vetted in the rarified atmosphere at the WTO. 151 From a civic
republican perspective, enhancing nongovernmental participation
may engender more deliberative decisionmaking at the WTO. 152
In summary, the WTO continues to make progress toward full
transparency, but has stalled in effecting opportunities for
constructive participation by NGOs and the private sector. Although
this situation is often criticized, few analysts have made the further
point that the WTO’s insularity contradicts its promotion of
participation in the trade law administration of WTO member
governments. Sooner or later, the normative dissonance involved in
going in two directions at once will force a reassessment at the WTO.
My hope and expectation is that the WTO will revise its internal
rules to provide meaningful opportunities for public participation and
to promote procedural fairness and regularity as a means of
enhancing accountability and legitimacy. In doing so, the WTO can

149. On the role of Transparency International, see Fredrik Galtung, A Global
Network to Curb Corruption: The Experience of Transparency International, in THE
THIRD FORCE: THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY 17 (Ann M. Florini ed.,
2000). On the role of Oxfam, see CRAIG WARKENTIN, RESHAPING W ORLD POLITICS 116-27
(2001). See also Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology and International Law, 42 HARV.
INT’ L L.J. 47, 105 (2001) (suggesting that transnational NGOs transform the two-level
game into a multi-level game); Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics:
The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 434 (1998) (framing the analogy of the
two-level game).
150. NGOs at the WTO, supra note 123, at 135–37.
151. See José E. Alvarez, The WTO as Linkage Machine, 96 A M. J. INT’L L. 146, 151
(2002) (suggesting that trade insiders may recommend similar but inappropriate
solutions for problems).
152. Cf. Robert O. Keohane, Governance in a Partially Globalized World, in
GOVERNING GLOBALIZATION: POWER, AUTHORITY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 325, 343
(David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2002) (suggesting that international
institutions be designed so that persuasion, not merely interests and bargaining,
plays an important role); MARY KALDOR, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: A N ANSWER TO WAR
148 (2003) (stating that global civil society offers a possibility for the voices, if not the
votes, of the victims of globalization to be heard); Marco Verweij & Timothy E. Josling,
Special Issue: Deliberately Democratizing Multilateral Organization, 16
GOVERNANCE 1 (2003) (noting the important role of deliberation).
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be aided by insights drawn from the field of administrative law. 153
The coming challenge will be to fruitfully transplant principles
developed for a national context to the WTO. 154
III. F UTURE STEPS FOR THE WTO
Part III presents several proposals for how the WTO can do
more to enhance transparency and participation both at the national
level and at the WTO. Section A addresses the national level and
Section B addresses improvements needed inside the WTO.
A. National Level
The most obvious future direction for WTO negotiations is to
strengthen the obligations in WTO agreements for domestic
transparency and participation at the national level. Unfortunately,
very little of this will be accomplished in the current WTO
negotiating round. The major issue that had been on the table was
transparency in government procurement, but in August 2004, the
WTO General Council decided to drop that issue from the
negotiations. 155
Besides the procedural dimension of national transparency,
there is also a substantive dimension, and it would still be possible
for WTO negotiations to make progress in that area. By a
substantive dimension, I mean attention to government restrictions
on the inward flow of information. One serious problem today is that
some governments, such as China, restrict transborder trade in
informational services provided through the internet.156 Such
restrictions should be attacked in ongoing GATS negotiations.
B. Improvements Inside the WTO
Section B offers proposals in four areas: (1) negotiations, (2)
153. Daniel C. Esty, Linkages and Governance: NGOs at the World Trade
Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 709, 728 (1998) (calling for the WTO to create
a body of administrative rules and procedures and to adhere to principles of
administrative law).
154. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal
Transplants and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1295
(2001) (discussing vertical borrowing from national to international law).
155. Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August
2004,
WT/L/579,
para.
1(g)
(Aug.
2,
2004),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/ddadraft_31jul04_e.pdf (last visited Nov. 3,
2004). The Doha Ministerial Declaration had noted the possibility of clarifications or
improvements to GATT Article X. Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)DEC/1, para.
27
(Nov.
20,
2001),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.doc (last visited
Nov. 3, 2004).
156. Charles Hutzler, China Finds New Ways to Restrict Access to the Internet,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2004, at B1.
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rulemaking, (3) dispute settlement, and (4) parliamentary input.
1. Negotiations
The transparency of WTO negotiations continues to improve.
Before and during the 2001 Ministerial Conference in Doha and the
2003 Ministerial Conference in Cancún, the WTO did not release any
of the draft negotiating texts to the public. This gap in information
made it difficult for the interested public to follow what was
happening in the negotiations and to influence them. WTO
opaqueness also occurred with respect to the draft negotiating text
on the issue of the compulsory licensing of drugs. The so-called
“Motta Text” of December 16, 2002 was never posted on the WTO
website.157 Yet in the most recent trade negotiations, the WTO has
moved away from these restrictive practices. In the days leading up
to the August 2004 decision,158 the WTO Secretariat posted the draft
texts.159
By contrast, the WTO has not made improvements in
participatory opportunities in the various WTO committees, bodies,
councils, etc.160 No modalities exist for the public to offer comments to
negotiators as to how the Doha Round objectives might be
achieved.161 The WTO’s obstinacy can be contrasted to the openness
shown in the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas,
where the governments have set up a Civil Society Committee, which
issued an “Open and Ongoing Invitation” for civil society to provide
written contributions to the governments. 162 All (or nearly all) of the
comments received since 2000 are posted on the FTAA website. 163 In
157. See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Seen Losing Ground in Latest Draft of Reform
Proposal on TRIPs/Medicines, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Dec. 17, 2002, at A8 (discussing Motta draft text).
158. See Breakthrough on Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2004, at A-18.
159. WTO News, First Draft Discussed as Chairs Warn of 30 July ‘Drop Dead’
Deadline
(July
20,
2004),
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news04_e/dda_package_sum_19_20july04_e.htm
(last visited Nov. 3, 2004); WTO News, Members Comment on New Draft as Chair
Warns
of
Overload
(July
30,
2004),
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news04_e/dda_package_sum_30july04_e.htm (last
visited Nov. 3, 2004). Both of these news releases contained links to the draft WTO
negotiating texts.
160. See supra Part II.
161. See supra Part II.
162. See OPEN AND ONGOING INVITATION TO CIVIL SOCIETY IN FTAA PARTICIPATING
C OUNTRIES, FTAA C OMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES ON THE
PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY (Mar. 31, 2004), available at http://www.ftaaalca.org/spcomm/SOC/INVITATION/SOC15r5_e.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2004); see also
Eric Dannenmaier, Trade, Democracy, and the FTAA: Public Access to the Process of
Constructing a Free Trade Area of the Americas, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1066 (2004).
163. See http://www.ftaa-alca.org/SPCOMM/COMMCS_E.ASP (last visited Nov. 3,
2004).
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my view, the WTO should follow this enlightened practice from the
Americas.
2. Rulemaking
WTO entities have also refused to solicit public comments in
ongoing rulemaking functions. For example, in April 2004, the WTO
Appellate Body circulated a set of draft amendments to its Working
Procedures and invited member governments to submit comments. 164
The Appellate Body, however, did not ask for comments from the
public or from private attorneys that regularly practice before it in
representing governments. 165 In 2000, the WTO’s TBT Committee
enacted a decision on “Principles for the Development of
International Standards.” 166 Despite the implications of this decision
for activities outside the WTO, the TBT Committee did not seek
public comments.
The WTO’s hidebound attitude about participation differs from
that of some other international organizations that have embraced
new e-government technologies to seek input from the public. For
example, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change’s Clean Development Mechanism, the InterAmerican Development Bank, and the North American Commission
on Environmental Cooperation have begun to seek public comments
on new proposals. 167 As more international organizations follow,
164. Proposed Amendments to the Working Procedures for Appellate Review,
Communication from the Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/8 (Apr. 8, 2004),
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_home.asp?language=1&_=1 (last visited Nov. 3, 2004)
(One can find this document by selecting simple search and inputting “WT/AB/WP/8”
in the “Document symbol” field.). The new Working Procedures were finalized in
October. Working Procedures for Appellate Review, Communication from the
Appellate
Review,
WT/AB/WP/W/9
(Oct.
7,
2004),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/wpw9_e.doc (last visited Nov. 3, 2004)
[hereinafter Working Procedures for the Appellate Review].
165. See Working Procedures for the Appellate Review, supra note 164.
166. Decisions and Recommendations Adopted by the Committee Since 1 January
1995, Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, G/TBT/1/Rev.8, part. IX (May 23,
2002), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_e.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
167. See, e.g., OECD Invites Comments on Draft Revision of its Corporate
Governance Principles, Jan. 12, 2004 (no longer available online, on file with author);
U NITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK C ONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLEAN
DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM, OPENING OF PUBLIC COMMENTS PERIOD ON CDM-PDD AT
VALIDATION
STAGE,
http://cdm.unfccc.int/CDMNews/issues/issues/I137_7992737/viewnewsitem.html (last
visited Nov. 3, 2004); INTER-A MERICAN DEVELOPMENT, WE WANT YOUR OPINION:
PUBLIC
C ONSULTATION
ON
IDB
STRATEGIES
AND
POLICIES,
http://www.iadb.org/aboutus/iii/public_consultation.cfm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004);
N ORTH A MERICAN C OMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL C OOPERATION, CEC INVITES
PUBLIC C OMMENT ON DRAFT DOCUMENT: FUTURE DIRECTIONS UNDER THE C OMMISSION
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL C OOPERATION SOUND MANAGEMENT OF C HEMICALS INITIATIVE
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there will be a greater need for a “Global Register” to announce
opportunities for public comment.168 There will also need to be
efficient mechanisms for reading and analyzing public comments to
international organizations as the number of comments increases.
3. Dispute Settlement
The benefits of greater transparency are especially compelling for
WTO dispute settlement, the one area of WTO law where nonconsensus decisionmaking is imposed. In the eyes of many observers,
however, the non-transparency required by WTO dispute rules has
served to undermine the legitimacy of panel and Appellate Body
decisions.169 Recently, the U.S. government sought to open up panel
hearings in the Biotech Products case, but the other complaining
parties refused to go along.170 The U.S. government has been more
successful in bilateral free trade negotiations, where its prospective
trading partners have agreed to transparency in dispute panels. For
example, the U.S.–Morocco Free Trade Agreement states that
parties have “a right to at least one hearing before the panel and
that [any] . . . such hearing[s] shall be open to the public.”171
A body of analysis already exists about the limited progress
made by WTO panels and the Appellate Body in accepting amicus
curiae briefs,172 and so that situation will not be reviewed here except
(Apr.
14,
2004)
available
at
http://www.cec.org/news/details/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=2605 (last visited Nov.
3, 2004).
168. See Steve Charnovitz, Economic and Social Actors in the World Trade
Organization, 7 ILSA J. INT’L & C OMP. L. 259, 274 (2001) (calling attention to the trend
in international organizations of soliciting public comments and proposing a Global
Federal Register).
169. See, e.g., Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Reflections on the Process of Clarification
and Improvement of the DSU, in THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1995–2003
105, 110 (Federico Ortino et al. eds., 2004) (stating that increased transparency will
enhance the legitimacy of the dispute settlement process); Lacarte, supra note 81, at
684 (suggesting open hearings for panels and the Appellate Body); Donald McRae,
What is the Future of WTO Dispute Settlement?, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 17 (2004)
(stating that the failure to open panel and Appellate Body hearings to the public and
to allow public access to the pleadings of the parties undermines the legitimacy of the
system). Ehlermann and Lacarte were members of the Appellate Body; McRae has
served as a WTO panelist.
170. Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Fails in Campaign to Open Up WTO GMO Panel
Proceedings to Public, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), May 5, 2004, at A-1.
171. U.S.–Morocco Free Trade Agreement, art. 20.8(1)(a), June 15, 2004, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/FInal_Text/Section_In
dex.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
172. See, e.g., Jared B. Cawley, Friend of the Court: How the WTO Justifies the
Acceptance of the Amicus Curiae Brief from Non-Governmental Organizations, 23
PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 47 (2004); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The WTO’s Legitimacy Crisis:
Reflections on the Law and Politics of WTO Dispute Resolution, 13 A M. REV. INT’L
ARB. 197, 199-205 (2002); Duncan B. Hollis, Private Actors in Public International
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to make one point. The Appellate Body ought to be more transparent
about what it learns from amicus briefs. For example in the
Softwood Lumber Final Determination decision in 2004, the
Appellate Body reported that it had received a brief from the
Indigenous Network on Economies and Trade and a joint brief from
Defenders of Wildlife, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and
the Northwest Ecosystem Alliance.173 Without revealing the content
of the briefs, the Appellate Body then stated that it did not find it
necessary to take the two amicus curiae briefs into account in
rendering its decision.174 In a situation like that, the interested
public understandably has a hard time knowing whether the
Appellate Body’s reasoning and conclusion would have benefited
from taking the briefs into account. My recommendation is for the
Appellate Body to post on its webpage each amicus brief that it
receives.
4. A Parliamentary Body
In recent years, parliamentarians from many countries have
held occasional interparliamentary conferences to discuss the
WTO. 175 The most recent conference was held in September 2003
alongside the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún, where
delegates from seventy national parliaments and five regional
parliaments participated.176 The declaration adopted by the
parliamentarians called for a “parliamentary dimension to
international trade negotiations and arrangements.” 177 Although
about thirty members of the U.S. Congress made the journey to
Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for the Retention of State Sovereignty, 25 B.C.
INT’ L & C OMP. L. REV. 235, 238-42 (2002); Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade, Sovereignty,
Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization, 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 211,
217 (2002) (characterizing the decision to permit amicus brief as a judicial mistake);
Jacqueline Peel, Giving the Public a Voice in the Protection of the Global
Environment: Avenues for Participation by NGOs in Dispute Resolution at the
European Court of Justice and World Trade Organization, 12 COLO. J. INT’L E NVTL.
L & POL’Y 47, 69-70 (2001) (fearing that businesses will participate more than public
interest groups); Cesare P.R. Romano, The Americanization of International
Litigation, 19 OHIO. ST. L. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 89, 105-09 (2003); Brigitte Stern, Private
Entities and the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, in THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (Patrick F. J. Macrory,
Arthur E. Appleton, and Michael G. Plummer eds., Springer, forthcoming 2005)
(manuscript on file with author).
173. Softwood Lumber Final Determination, supra note 92, para. 9.
174. Id.
175. Erika Mann, A Parliamentary Dimension to the WTO – More Than Just A
Vision?!, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 659, 662-63 (2004).
176. See Cancun Session of the Parliamentary Conference on the WTO, InterParliamentary Union & European Parliament (Sept. 9 & 12, 2003),
http://www.ipu.org/splz%2De/cancun.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
177. Id. para. 14.
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Cancún, none of them participated in the inter-parliamentary
conference.178 Based on interviews, Gregory Shaffer concluded that
“[t]he US government and US Congress generally are not supportive
of global inter-parliamentarian meetings.”179 In my view, this
attitude by the U.S. Congress is short-sighted and misses an
opportunity for elected officials to learn from other parliaments.
Recently, David Skaggs, a former member of the U.S. House of
Representatives, suggested that “an increased role for national
parliamentarians and Congresspersons and for national and
international NGOs should have a direct bearing on the public’s
sense of the WTO system’s legitimacy and trustworthiness.” 180
IV. CONCLUSION
The WTO continues to be criticized by friends and foes for its
penchant for secrecy and its resistance to more open, inclusive
participatory practices. Moreover, the friends point out how the
WTO’s closed doors give traction to the foes of world trade order.
Eventually, WTO member governments will reach a consensus that
reforms are needed.181 In my view, the sooner the better.
In this article, I make the case for rewriting the 1996 NGO
Guidelines182 so as to provide meaningful opportunities for
nongovernmental participation in WTO operations. The article
describes the historical roots of the trade transparency norm,
analyzes the WTO text and related judicial interpretations, and
then seeks to show that the norms for national trade administration
should be honored by the WTO. While I do not contend that the
connection between national trade and international trade law is
seamless, I do contend that the administrative law principles
applicable to a national government are relevant to rulemaking and
adjudication in international organizations. 183 As citizens of a nation
and denizens of the world, our aspirations for good governance
cannot be cabined within the nation-state.
178. Gregory Shaffer, Parliamentary Oversight of WTO Rule-Making: The
Political, Normative, and Practical Contexts, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 629, 641 (2004).
179. Id. at 642.
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Congressional Perspective, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 655, 657 (2004).
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and the private sector in its work more systematic in order to enhance the valueadded from that cooperation. São Paulo Consensus, U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development,
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para.
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(2004),
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/td410_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
182. See text accompanying supra note 97.
183. See Rubin, supra note 124, at 98 (denoting the field of international
administrative law).
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